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The purpose of this paper is to investigate what affected the post-crisis exchange rates of five East Asian 
countries: Singapore, Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia.  Based on intra-daily observations, we 
examine how and when these five East Asian currencies changed their correlations with the U.S. dollar 
and the Japanese yen.  During the time zones when East Asian markets were closed, the East Asian 
currencies kept strong correlations with the U.S. dollar throughout the pos-crisis period.  We, however, 
find structural breaks in the correlations during the time zones when East Asian markets were open.  In the 
post-crisis period, the first structural break arose when Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate.  The 
second structural break occurred when Indonesia and Thailand introduced inflation targeting.  The 
structural breaks suggest strong monetary and real linkage among East Asian countries.  After early 2000, 
the East Asian currencies increased correlations with the U.S. dollar and began reverting back to de facto 
pegs against the U.S. dollar in terms of their growth rates.   
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 1. Introduction 
Since the onset of the Asian crisis, what characterizes the East Asian exchange rates has been a topic of 
considerable discussion.  In the pre-crisis period, it was fairly evident that currencies of most East Asian 
economies maintained de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar.  Among the East Asian economies, Hong Kong was 
the only East Asian economy that adopted the fixed exchange rate regime backed by a currency board 
arrangement.  It was, however, well known that currencies in the other East Asian economies had 
maintained highly stable values against the U.S. dollar since the mid-1980s (see, for example, Frankel and 
Wei [1994], Goldberg and Klein [1997], and Ogawa [2001]).
1   
The de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar sometimes destabilized the real “effective” exchange rates of these 
currencies in the pre-crisis period.  In particular, as the Japanese yen depreciated against the U.S. dollar 
from April 1995 to the summer of 1997, appreciation of the real “effective” exchange rates reduced the 
export competitiveness and increased current account deficits in the East Asian economies (see, for 
example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini [1999], and Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki [1998]ʣ.  Several economists 
have, thus, proposed the desirability of intermediate exchange rate regimes in East Asia that might 
stabilize their effective exchange rates (see, for example, Bénassy-Quéré [1999], Williamson [1999, 2000], 
Rajan [2002]).  The bipolar or two-corner solution view of exchange rates, in contrast, states that 
intermediate policy regimes between hard pegs and floating are not sustainable (see, for example, Fischer 
[2001]).
2  The post-crisis experience in East Asia taught us that the road to the intermediate exchange rate 
regimes in the region would be pretty hard.
3
In the post-crisis period, Hong Kong kept its currency board arrangement and the Chinese yuan virtually 
maintained its peg to the U.S. dollar.  After experiencing some transitional regime, Malaysia started 
pegging to the U.S. dollar on September 1st 1998.  In contrast, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea as well as 
the Philippines and Taiwan have adopted managed float since the crisis (see Table 1).  After going through 
steep devaluations and high volatility in 1997-98, their currencies have mostly stabilized over the past few 
years.  Hernández and Montiel (2001) have suggested that they are now allowed to float more at low 
frequencies than before 1997-98.  Some other observers, however, have argued that the so-called floating 
exchange regimes of the countries are not really floating when we look at high-frequency day-to-day 
observations (Kawai and Akiyama [2000], McKinnon [2001], and McKinnon and Schnabl [2002]).  In 
                                                        
1 Takagi (1999) is an exceptional study that found some significant correlations between the East Asian 
currencies and the Japanese yen during this period. 
2 Fischer, however, argued that the proponents of the bipolar view have probably exaggerated their point.  
Frankel (1999) discussed that no single currency regime is right for all countries or at all times. 
3 Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and Mauro (2000, 2001) showed that on economic criteria, ASEAN appears less 
suited for a regional currency arrangement than Europe before the Maastricht Treaty, although the 
difference is not large.  
  1particular, using a regression framework from Frankel and Wei (1994), they interpreted that the East Asian 
currencies were reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar.
4
The purpose of this paper is to investigate what affected the post-crisis exchange rates of five East Asian 
countries: Singapore, Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia.  During the crisis, several East Asian 
countries shifted their exchange rate regimes from de facto U.S. Dollar pegs to managed float.  In the 
following post-crisis period, the East Asian countries except for Malaysia had no institutional switch of 
exchange rate regimes.  It is thus far from clear why the East Asian currencies reverted back to de facto 
pegs against the U.S. dollar in the late 1990s.  Based on intra-daily observations, we examine how and 
when these five East Asian currencies changed their correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen.  
During the time zones when East Asian (and European) markets were closed, we find that the East Asian 
currencies kept strong correlations with the U.S. dollar throughout the post-crisis period.  We, however, 
find structural breaks in the correlations during the time zones when East Asian markets are open.  In the 
post-crisis period, the first structural break arose when Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate on 
September 1st 1998.  The second structural break occurred when Indonesia and Thailand adopted inflation 
targeting in early 2000.   
During the time zones when East Asian markets were open, several East Asian currencies, particularly 
those of ASEAN, temporarily increased correlations with the Japanese yen in the post-crisis period.  The 
increased correlations were conspicuous before September 1st 1998.  However, after Malaysia adopted the 
fixed exchange rate, the East Asian currencies, particularly the Singapore dollar and the Thai baht, 
increased correlations with the U.S. dollar.  After early 2000, most of the East Asian currencies increased 
correlations with the U.S. dollar and began reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar even 
during the time zones when East Asian markets are open.   
Korea started inflation targeting in September 1998.  However, inflation targeting in Korea was not 
binding when Korean economy experienced unexpectedly dramatic recovery.  It was early 2000 when 
inflation targeting became binding for Korean monetary policy.  In contrast, inflation targeting was 
binding in Indonesia and Thailand soon after its introduction. It is therefore highly possible that there was 
a structural break of monetary policy in Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea in early 2000.  Since the share of 
imports in consumption goods is large in these open economies, the structural break of monetary policy 
might have affected their exchange rate policies.  In particular, since the U.S. dollar has been dominant in 
invoice currencies in their imports (see, for example, Fukuda [1995]), the introduction of inflation 
targeting might have increased their incentives to stabilize their exchange rates against the U.S. dollar. 
                                                        
4 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) found that many emerging market countries that say they allow their 
exchange rate to float mostly do not. 
  2A noteworthy implication from our empirical results is that a regime switch in an East Asian country had 
an enormously large impact on the exchange rates of other East Asian countries that had no regime switch.  
This probably reflects the fact that economic linkage among East Asian countries is tight in monetary and 
real transactions.  A regime switch in a country had a strong impact on its neighboring economies and that 
the affected economies had another impacts on their neighboring economies.  Our empirical studies 
support this view and suggest that the exchange rate linkage was very important to see why the post-crisis 
East Asian countries had a tendency reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 theoretically considers how exchange rates can be linked in 
East Asia.  After explaining the method of estimations and the data in section 3, section 4 investigates how 
large impacts the regime switches in some East Asian country had on the post-crisis exchange regimes in 
East Asian countries.  Sections 5 and 6 provide formal tests to explore the existence of structural breaks.  
Section 7 examines how volatility of exchange rates changed in the post-crisis period.  After providing 




2. Linkages of the Exchange Rates in East Asia:  An Example 
In order to understand the interdependence of exchange rates in East Asian economies, this section 
theoretically considers an exchange rate that is determined by the weighted average of exchange rates of 
major trade partners.  The Singapore dollar under a currency basket regime is a particular example for such 
an exchange rate.  For analytical simplicity, we suppose that the Singapore dollar is determined by a basket 
of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Malaysia ringgit.  All of the exchange rates are denominated 
by a common numéraire currency such as the Swiss Franc.  Denoting the nominal exchange rates of the 
U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the Singapore dollar, and the Malaysia ringgit by USDt, JPYt, SDt, and MRt 
respectively, the growth rate of Singapore dollar is written as 
 
(1)   ∆SDt = a1⋅∆USDt + a2⋅∆JPYt + a3⋅∆MRt + εt, 
 
where ∆Et is the growth rate of an exchange rate Et (E = USD, JPY, SD, and MR), and εt is a disturbance 
term. 
If the growth rate of the Malaysia ringgit (∆MRt) is determined by  
 
(2)   ∆MRt = b1⋅∆USDt + b2⋅∆JPYt + b3⋅∆SDt + ηt, 
  3 
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where υt ≡ (εt +a3⋅ηt)/(1-a3⋅b3) and ζt ≡ (b3⋅εt +ηt)/(1-a3⋅b3). 
To the extent that εt and ηt are independent of ∆USDt and ∆JPYt, equation (3) indicates that how the 
Singapore dollar is correlated with the U.S. dollar and with the Japanese yen depends not only the basket 
weights of the Singapore dollar in (1) but also on the basket weights of the Malaysia ringgit in (2).  Thus, 
even if Singapore keeps its basket weights constant, the regime switch of the Malaysian exchange rate 
policy can have a significant impact on the Singapore dollar, particular when a3 is large. 
For example, suppose that the basket weights of the Singapore dollar are based on trade weights among 
five major trade partners.  Then, noting that the Hong Kong dollar is fixed to the U.S. dollar, Singapore’s 
trade weights in 1997 imply that a1 = 0.4131, a2 = 0.2205, and a3 = 0.2871.
5  Therefore, when the weights 
of the Malaysia ringgit are also based on the trade weights among five major trade partners in 1997, that is, 
b1 = 0.2896, b2 = 0.2830, and b3 = 0.2833, equations (3) and (4) lead to theoretical correlations in Table 
2-(1).
6  They indicate that both the Malaysia ringgit and the Singapore dollar have slightly larger 
correlation with the U.S. dollar than with the Japanese yen.  The weights of the Japanese yen, however, 
amount to more than 0.3 in both currencies before Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate. 
In contrast, when the Malaysia ringgit is fixed to the U.S. dollar, it holds that ∆MRt ʹ∆USDt, that is, b1 
= 1, and b2 = b3 = 0.  Substituting the trade weights in 1997, 1998, and 1999 into a1, a2, and a3 respectively, 
we obtain Table 2-(2).  The table summarizes theoretical correlations of the Singapore dollar with the U.S. 
dollar and the Japanese yen after Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate. 
Comparing the theoretical correlations in Table 2-(2) with those in Table 2-(1), the weight of the U.S. 
dollar rose from 0.54 to 0.7, while the weight of the Japanese yen declined from 0.328 to 0.2.  This implies 
that the switch of the Malaysian exchange rate regime had significant impacts on the theoretical 
correlations of the Singapore dollar.  It is noteworthy that these changes occurred even if Singapore did not 
                                                        
5 The weights we use the following calculations are based on IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, various 
issues. 
6 The values of a1 and b1 are calculated by the sum of the trade weights to the U.S.A and those to Hong 
Kong. 
  4switch its exchange rate regime.  These changes are attributable to the high degree of interdependence 
between the Singapore dollar and the Malaysia ringgit. 
 
 
3. The Estimation Method and Data 
In order to investigate the determinants of exchange rates in the East Asian countries, we use the method 
of Frankel-Wei to estimate the weights of the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen before and after the crisis.  
In this approach, an independent currency is chosen as an arbitrary numéraire for measuring the exchange 
variation.  The goal here is to estimate the weight a currency assigns to another currency on a given 
frequency.  Suppose that X
j
t is the exchange rate of an East Asian country j, where  j = Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan.  Suppose also that USDt is the U.S. dollar and that JPYt is the Japanese yen.  
The estimated model, where the local currency’s value against the independent numéraire currency is 




t = constant term + α1⋅∆USDt + α2⋅∆JPYt, 
 
where ∆Et is the growth rate of Et.  A heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix 
is calculated by the method of Newey and West (1987).  In several preliminary estimations, we included 
the Sterling Pond in equation (5) as an additional explanatory variable.  However, the estimated coefficient 
of the Sterling Pond was, if positive, not significantly different from zero, without changing the other 
estimated coefficients.
7  We therefore use only ∆USDt and ∆JPYt as explanatory variables in the following 
analysis. 
The data of each currency’s exchange rate is the intra-daily data.  The data set was downloaded from 
Datastream.  For missing data, we supplemented it with the data set in Bloomberg.  Table 3 summarizes 
what time our intra-daily data is available in Tokyo time and in New York time.  Depending on the 
availability, the span of each time zone varies from 0.5 to 6 hours.  However, except for the Taiwan dollar, 
we can classify the exchange rate movements of each business day into those when East Asian markets are 
open, those when European markets are open, and those when both East Asian and European markets are 
closed.  The classification provides us with useful information because news is usually revealed when the 
market is open. 
As in the previous studies, the following analysis will use the Swiss Franc as a numéraire.  The Swiss 
                                                        
7 The result is consistent with findings in previous literature that showed no significant impact of Mark or 
Euro in similar regressions. 
  5Franc has a desirable property as a numéraire because it is widely transacted in international markets but 
has little linkage with the East Asian currencies.  However, the choice of the numéraire might be arbitrary.  
In particular, when there is an idiosyncratic shock on the Swiss Franc, the exchange rates denominated by 
the Swiss Franc would show spurious correlations in equation (5).  The spurious correlations are likely 
when European markets are open because news on the Swiss Franc tends to be revealed during the time 
zone.  They are, however, less likely when European markets are closed.   
We estimate equation (5) for each time zone in four alternative sample periods: (i) from January 7th 
1997 to June 15th 1997, (ii) from February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998, (iii) from the September 
2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999, and (iv) from January 4th 2000 to September 5th 2002.  The period (i) is 
the pre-crisis period.  We choose this period in order to see whether the previous results during the 
pre-crisis period are still confirmed by our intra-daily data.  We break the post-crisis period into (ii), (iii), 
and (iv).  In the post-crisis period, two structural breaks are assumed to arise when Malaysia introduced the 
fixed exchange rate regime and when some East Asian countries introduced inflation targeting effectively. 
The first break is a natural choice because the Malaysian regime shift was the only drastic switch of the 
exchange rate regime in the post-crisis East Asian countries.  Before shifting to the fixed exchange rate 
regime, Malaysia was under managed float after the crisis.  In particular, since early 1998, the Malaysian 
government had explored a new economic policy, including the stabilization policy of real effective 
exchange rates of the ringgit.
8  The introduction of the fixed exchange rate on September 1st 1998 was 
therefore a dramatic regime shift in Malaysia (see Figure 1).  We start the estimation period of (ii) from the 
beginning of February 1998.  This is because except for the Indonesian Rupiah, most of the East Asian 
countries almost stabilized the exchange rates after the end of January 1998. 
The choice of the second structural break may be controversial.  However, the regime shift in monetary 
policy can affect the exchange rate policy.  In particular, when the share of imports in consumption goods 
is large, it is important to control exchange rates to achieve the inflation target.  Among ASEAN countries, 
Indonesia announced inflation targeting at the beginning of 2000 and so did Thailand in May 2000.  In the 
case of Korea, inflation targeting started in September 1998.  However, inflation targeting in Korea was 
not binding when Korean economy experienced unexpectedly dramatic recovery.  It was early 2000 when 
inflation targeting became binding for Korean monetary policy.  It is therefore highly possible that there 
was a structural break of monetary policy in Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea in early 2000.   
                                                        
8 For example, the National Economic Action Council (NEAC), which was established by Prime Minister 
Mahathir in December 1997, announced the National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) in August 1998.  
The plan stressed the importance of stabilizing the real “effective” exchange rates and proposed the 
adoption of a trade weighted basket system as a desirable exchange rate regime.  The plan was based on the 
idea that the de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar sometimes destabilized the real “effective” exchange rates. 
  6In the following analysis, we investigate whether there were structural breaks in equation (5).  In 
particular, we explore the existence of structural breaks not only in the country that had a regime shift in 
monetary policy but also in other countries that did not.  The motivation is to see whether a regime switch 
in an East Asian country had a significant impact on the exchange rates of other East Asian countries that 
had no regime switch.  If economic linkage among East Asian countries is tight in monetary and real 
transactions, a regime switch in a country would have a strong impact on its neighboring economies and 
that the affected economies would have another impact on their neighboring economies.   
 
 
4. The Estimation Results  
(i) From January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997 
  We first estimated equation (5) for each available time zone in the sample period from January 7th 1997 
to June 15th 1997.  We made the estimations to see whether the previous results during the pre-crisis 
period are still confirmed by our intra-daily data.  Table 4 summarizes the estimation results.  Our 
estimations are different from previous studies not only in the data frequency but also in the sample period.  
The results, however, almost confirm previous ones that were estimated based on less frequency data such 
as daily, weakly, or monthly data. 
In all countries, the estimated coefficient of the U.S. dollar was large and was close to one for almost all 
of the time zones.  In contrast, the estimated coefficient of the Japanese yen was small for all of the time 
zones in all countries.  In Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan, the coefficient of the Japanese yen was never 
significantly positive for any time zone.  In Malaysia, it was not significantly positive except for a time 
zone.  In the case of Singapore, it was significantly positive in several time zones.  However, even in 
Singapore, the U.S. dollar had the dominant weight in the currency basket of the Singapore dollar.  In 
particular, the estimated coefficient of the U.S. dollar was much larger than the theoretical one that was 
calculated by the trade weights in Table 2.  The results imply that the East Asian currencies were under de 
facto pegs against the U.S. dollar. 
The adjusted R
2’s of the estimated equations were large during most of the time zones in Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Malaysia.  In contrast, in Korea, the adjusted R
2’s were relatively large during the time zones 
between 11:30 and 19:00 in New York time (that is, 1:30-9:00 in Tokyo time) but were small during the 
other time zones.  In Thailand, the adjusted R
2 was large during 12:00-18:00 in New York time (that is, 
2:00-8:00 in Tokyo time) but it dropped down dramatically during the rest of the time zones.  The results 
probably reflect the fact that the Thai baht and the Korean won had several modest devaluations in the first 
half of 1997 before experiencing devastating currency attacks.   
  7 
(ii) From February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998 
We next estimated equation (5) for each available time zone in the post-crisis period before the 
Malaysian government shifted its exchange rate regime from managed float to the fix exchange rate.  After 
the Thai crisis in July 1997, several East Asian countries experienced serious currency devaluations.   
During the crisis, the market values of the Malaysia ringgit, the Thai baht and the Korean won that moved 
to managed float had dropped to nearly half of the pre-crisis level until January 1998.  It was after the end 
of January 1998 when these currencies were almost stabilized.  We thus estimated equation (5) from 
February 2nd 1998.   
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results.  Overall, compared with those in Table 4, the adjusted R
2’s of 
the estimated equations in most of the time zones dropped down dramatically in all countries.  This implies 
that the East Asian currencies increased their idiosyncratic flexibility after the crisis.  The estimated 
coefficients, however, showed different characteristics depending on the time zones. 
During the time zones when both East Asian and European markets were closed, most of the East Asian 
currencies kept strong correlations with the U.S. dollar.  For example, the coefficients of the U.S. dollar in 
Singapore and in Malaysia exceeded one during 12:00-17:30, 17:30-18:00, and 18:00-19:00 in New York 
time (that is, 1:00-7:30, 7:30-8:00, and 8:00-9:00 in Tokyo time).  The coefficient of the U.S. dollar 
exceeded one in Thailand and was close to one in Taiwan during 12:00-17:30 in New York time.  In Korea, 
the coefficient of the U.S. dollar exceeded one during 12:00-18:00 in New York time. 
In contrast, when East Asian markets were open, the coefficients of the Japanese yen exceeded those of 
the U.S. dollar during several time zones.  For example, the coefficients of the Japanese yen exceeded 
those of the U.S. dollar in the Singapore dollar and in the Malaysia ringgit during all of the time zone 
between 10:00am and 8:00pm in Tokyo time (that is, between 20:00pm and 6:00am in New York time).
9  
The coefficients of the Japanese yen exceeded those of the U.S. dollar in the Thai baht during all of the 
time zone between 8:00am and 2:00am in Tokyo time and in the Taiwan dollar during 7:30-13:00 and 
18:30-20:00 in Tokyo time.  Even in the Korean won, the coefficients of the Japanese yen were almost 
equal to those of the U.S. dollar during 13:00-18:30 and 18:30-20:00 in Tokyo time.  The results indicate 
that the East Asian currencies increased the correlations with the Japanese yen after the crisis during the 
time zones when East Asian markets were open. 
The above results have two noteworthy implications.  One is that the structural break occurred even in 
Singapore and Taiwan.  Compared with the other countries, Singapore and Taiwan experienced relatively 
                                                        
9 The coefficients of the Japanese yen also exceeded those of the U.S. dollar in the Singapore dollar during 
9:00-10:00, 20:00-1:30 and 1:00-2:00 in Tokyo time and the Malaysia ringgit during 1:30-2:00. 
  8modest currency devaluation during the crisis.  These countries therefore did not have an explicit shift of 
the exchange regime after the crisis.  Our results, however, suggest that the regime switches in other East 
Asian countries had a large impact on their exchange rates that had no regime switch. 
The other is that the structural break was observed mostly when East Asian markets were open.  In 
general, news from the U.S. markets, which may cause the fluctuations of the U.S. dollar, tends to be 
revealed when the U.S. markets are open.  To the extent that the exchange rates are flexible, the impacts of 
the news from the U.S. markets on the East Asian currencies would thus be reflected in the coefficient of 
the U.S. dollar during the time zones when the U.S. markets are open.  In contrast, news from Japanese 
markets, which may cause the fluctuations of the Japanese yen, tends to be revealed when the Japanese 
markets are open.  Therefore, the impacts of the news from Japanese markets on the East Asian currencies 
would be reflected in the coefficient of the Japanese yen during the time zones when Japanese markets are 
open.  Our empirical results support this view, suggesting that the East Asian currencies increased their 
flexibility after the crisis. 
 
(iii) From the September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999 
On September 1st 1998, the Malaysian government suddenly changed its exchange rate to the fixed 
exchange rate.  It was the only drastic switch of the exchange rate regime that occurred in the post-crisis 
East Asian countries.  In this sub-section, we make estimations after the Malaysian government shifted its 
exchange rate regime. Since α1 = 1 and α2 = 0 in Malaysia after September 1998, we estimated equation 
(5) for each available time zone in Singapore, Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan.  The motivation of the 
estimation is to investigate how the dramatic regime shift in Malaysia affected the exchange rates of these 
East Asian countries that had no explicit regime switch. 
Table 6 summarizes the estimation results.  During the time zones when East Asian and European 
markets were closed, the East Asian currencies had strong correlations with the U.S. dollar.  The results are 
more robust than those in Table 5.  In all of the four currencies, the coefficient of the U.S. dollar was close 
to one during 12:00-17:30 in New York time (that is, 1:00-7:30 in Tokyo time).  Except for Taiwan where 
the relevant time zones are not available, it was also close to one during 17:30-18:00, and 18:00-19:00 in 
New York time (that is, 7:30-8:00, and 8:00-9:00 in Tokyo time).
10  In the case of Korea, the latter result 
was in marked contrast with those in Table 4 where the coefficient was not statistically different from zero 
during the time zones between noon and 6pm in New York time.  Compared with those in Table 4, the 
adjusted R
2’s were still lower than those in the pre-crisis period in all countries.  However, compared with 
those in Table 5, we can see that the adjusted R
2’s became larger after the regime shift in Malaysia.  This 
                                                        
10 In Thailand, the latter time zone is 18:00-21:00 in New York time because of missing data. 
  9implies that the East Asian currencies reduced their idiosyncratic flexibility after the regime shift.  
During the time zones when East Asian markets were open, the coefficients of the Japanese yen were 
still statistically different from zero.  In addition, the coefficient of the Japanese yen exceeded that of the 
U.S. dollar during some of the time zones.  However, compared with those in Table 4, the number of such 
time zones declined dramatically.  For example, if we focus on the time zone between 8:00am and 8:00pm 
in Tokyo time, the coefficient of the Japanese yen exceeded that of the U.S. dollar only in two of seven 
zones in Singapore, in one of four zones in Thailand and Taiwan, and in none of four zones in Korea.
11  
Even when the yen’s coefficient was larger, the difference between the coefficients of the Japanese yen and 
the U.S. dollar became much smaller than those in Table 5.  The results indicate that even when East Asian 
markets were open, the East Asian currencies reduced the correlations with the Japanese yen and increased 
the correlations with the U.S. dollar after the regime shift in Malaysia.  Compared with those in Table 5, 
the adjusted R
2’s increased in most of the time zones in all countries.  The increase in the adjusted R
2’s 
were, however, not large. 
The results have two interesting implications.  One is that the structural break in Malaysia had a large 
impact on the exchange rates of other East Asian countries that had no regime switch.  The changes were 
particularly conspicuous in Singapore and Thailand where economic linkage with Malaysia had been very 
tight.  The other is that the structural break was observed when East Asian markets were open.  To the 
extent that the exchange rates are flexible, the impacts of the news from Japanese markets on the East 
Asian currencies would be reflected in the coefficient of the Japanese yen during the time zones when 
Japanese markets were open.  In the last sub-section, the increased coefficient of the Japanese yen thus 
implied the increased flexibility in the East Asian exchange rates after the crisis.  However, since the 
coefficient of the Japanese yen declined after September 1998, the above empirical results suggest that the 
exchange rates became less flexible after the regime shift in Malaysia. 
 
(iv) From January 4th 2000 to September 5th 2002.   
    The introduction of inflation targeting is in principle a regime shift of domestic monetary policy.   
However, in a small open economy where the share of imports in consumption goods is large, it can have a 
strong impact on the exchange rate policy.  This is because the import prices are a key determinant of 
targeted inflation in such an economy.  In particular, when the U.S. dollar has been dominant in invoice 
currencies in their imports, the introduction of inflation targeting might have increased their incentives to 
stabilize their exchange rates against the U.S. dollar.  For example, in the appendix of Inflation Report 
(July 2002), the Bank of Thailand showed a simulation result that 10% depreciation of the Thai baht 
                                                        
11 Because of the data availability, the time zone in Taiwan starts from 7:30am in Tokyo time. 
  10against the U.S. dollar would cause about 0.9% increase of  core inflation rate.  It suggests that the 
exchange rate management is a critical factor to achieve the targeted inflation in Thailand. 
Korea started inflation targeting in September 1998.  However, inflation targeting in Korea was not 
binding when Korean economy experienced unexpectedly dramatic recovery.  It was early 2000 when 
inflation targeting became binding for Korean monetary policy.  In contrast, inflation targeting was 
binding in Indonesia and Thailand soon after its introduction. It is therefore highly possible that there was 
a structural break of monetary policy in Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea in early 2000.  We thus estimated 
equation (5) from January 4th 2000.   
Table 7 summarizes the estimation results.  When East Asian markets were closed, the coefficient of the 
U.S. dollar was close to one during all of the time zones.  In all of the four currencies, the coefficient of the 
U.S. dollar was greater than 0.8 during 6:00-19:00 in New York time (that is, 20:00-9:00 in Tokyo time).  
Except for Taiwan, it was greater than 0.9 during 12:00-18:00 in New York time (that is, 2:00-8:00 in 
Tokyo time).  In contrast, the coefficient of the Japanese yen was less than 0.1 during 12:00-18:00 in New 
York time in all countries.  
When East Asian markets were open (that is, during 8:00-20:00 in Tokyo time), the coefficient of the 
Japanese yen was never significantly positive in Taiwan, and lied between 0.1 and 0.2 in most of the time 
zones in other East Asian countries.  In contrast, the coefficient of the U.S. dollar rose up to the range 
between 0.75 and 0.9 in most of the time zones in all countries.  As a result, the coefficient of the Japanese 
yen never exceeded that of the U.S. dollar during any time zones and was less than one-fifth of that of the 
U.S. dollar during most of the time zones in all countries. The results indicate that even when East Asian 
markets were open, the East Asian currencies began reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar 
after early 2000.  It is noteworthy that the structural break of the exchange rates occurred in other East 
Asian countries that had no regime switch of monetary policy.  This implies the existence of a strong 
linkage among the East Asian exchange rates.   
To the extent that the exchange rates are flexible, the impacts of news from Japanese markets on the East 
Asian currencies would be reflected in the coefficient of the Japanese yen during the time zones when 
Japanese markets are open.  The above results thus suggest that the flexibility on the East Asian exchange 
rates declined after early 2000.  During most of the time zones, the adjusted R
2’s were larger than those in 
Table 6 and were almost comparable to those in the pre-crisis period in all countries.  However, the 
coefficient of the Japanese yen was significantly different from zero during most of the time zones in all 
countries except for Taiwan.  The result is in marked contrast with that in the pre-crisis period where the 
Japanese yen had no significantly positive coefficient except in limited time zones in Singapore.  This 
implies that de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar after early 2000 were accompanied by some degree of 
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5. Tests of Structural Breaks: The Case of Coefficient Dummies 
In the last section, we estimated equation (5) for each time zone in four alternative sample periods.  The 
estimations were based on the assumption that the East Asian exchange rates had three structural breaks:  
when the crisis occurred, when Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange rate regime, and when some East 
Asian countries introduced inflation targeting effectively.  The estimated coefficients suggested that the 
assumption was reasonable.  We have, however, provided no explicit test to support it.  The purpose of the 
following two sections is to provide formal tests to explore whether the assumption was correct.  
This section tests the existence of each structural break by using dummy variables.  Given the dates of 
structural breaks, the tests would verify whether there were significant structural changes in the 
coefficients of the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen for each time zone.  By using the intra-daily data, we 
estimate the following equation: 
 
(6)  ∆Xt = constant + β1⋅∆USDt + β2⋅∆JPYt + β12⋅Dt⋅∆USDt + β22⋅Dt⋅∆JPYt, 
 
where Dt is a dummy variable which takes one after the break but takes zero otherwise.  We can conclude 
that there was a structural break in the coefficient of the U.S. dollar if the coefficient of Dt⋅∆USDt is 
significantly different from zero.  We can also see a structural break in the coefficient of the Japanese yen 
if the coefficient of Dt⋅∆JPYt is significantly different from zero.  We estimate equation (6) for three 
alternative sample periods: (a) from January 7th 1997 to August 31th 1998, (b) from February 1st 1998 to 
December 29th 1998, and (c) from September 2nd 1998 to September 5th 2002. 
 
(a) From January 7th 1997 to August 31th 1998 
We first test whether the East Asian exchange rates had a structural break before and after the crisis.  We 
test this by estimating equation (6) from January 7th 1997 to August 31th 1998.  Since the period includes 
the turbulent period when several East Asian countries experienced serious currency devaluations, we 
excluded the period from July 2nd 1997 to January 31st 1998 from our sample period.  In the estimation, 
the dummy variable Dt takes one from February 1st 1998 to August 31th 1998 but takes zero otherwise.   
Table 8 summarizes the estimation results.  In all countries, the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt and Dt⋅∆JPYt 
were significantly different from zero in several time zones.  When the coefficient of Dt⋅∆USDt was 
significantly different from zero, it always took a negative value.  In contrast, if the coefficient of Dt⋅∆JPYt 
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significant structural break that decreased the coefficient of the U.S. dollar and increased the coefficient of 
the Japanese yen.  The results of the formal tests are highly consistent with our findings in the last section. 
The absolute values of the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt and Dt⋅∆JPYt tended to be particularly large when 
East Asian markets were open.  In Tokyo time, the coefficient of Dt⋅∆USDt took large negative values 
during 11:00-18:30 in Singapore, 9:00-13:00 and 16:00-18:30 in Malaysia, 8:00-18:30 in Thailand, and 
9:00-18:30 in Korea.  Their absolute values were almost equal to those of the coefficient of ∆USDt during 
the same time zone, implying that the structural break cancelled out the positive impact of the U.S. dollar 
that was observed before the crisis.  On the other hand, in Tokyo time, the coefficient of Dt⋅∆JPYt took 
large positive values during 11:00-18:30 in Singapore, 9:00-13:00 and 16:00-18:30 in Malaysia, and 
8:00-11:00 in Thailand.  This indicates that the structural break caused a positive impact of the Japanese 
yen that was not observed before the crisis. 
One exceptional time zone was 12:00-18:00 in New York time (that is, 2:00-8:00 in Tokyo time) when 
both East Asian and European markets were closed.  During this time zone, the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt 
and Dt⋅∆JPYt were not significantly different from zero in Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan, 
suggesting no structural change in these countries.  In Singapore, the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt and 
Dt⋅∆JPYt were significant.  However, even in Singapore, their absolute values were relatively small.  This 
supports our results that the structural break, if any, was very modest when both East Asian and European 
markets were closed.   
 
(b) From February 1st 1998 to December 29th 1998 
We next test whether the East Asian exchange rates had a structural break when Malaysia introduced the 
fixed exchange rate regime.  We test this by estimating equation (6) for the period from February 1st 1998 
to December 29th 1998.  In the estimation, the dummy variable Dt takes one from September 1st 1998 to 
December 29th 1998 but takes zero otherwise.  The significance of the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt and 
Dt⋅∆JPYt verify whether there was a structural break when Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange rate 
regime. Since the structural break in Malaysia was obvious, we estimated equation (6) for each available 
time zone in Singapore, Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan. 
Table 9 summarizes the estimation results.  In all countries, the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt and Dt⋅∆JPYt 
were significantly different from zero in various time zones.  The signs of the estimated were, however, 
completely reversed.  When the coefficient of Dt⋅∆USDt was significantly different from zero, it tended to 
be positive.  In contrast, if the coefficient of Dt⋅∆JPYt was significantly different from zero, it tended to be 
negative.  The significant coefficients were more conspicuous in Singapore and Thailand.  The results 
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decreased the coefficient of the Japanese yen, particularly in Singapore and Thailand.  The results are 
highly consistent with our findings in the last section. 
The absolute values of the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt and Dt⋅∆JPYt tended to be particularly large when 
East Asian markets were open.  In Tokyo time, the coefficient of Dt⋅∆USDt took large positive values 
during 9:00-11:00 and 16:00-18:30 in Singapore and 8:00-11:00 in Thailand.  The positive coefficient of 
∆USDt implies that the total impact of the U.S. dollar became close to one in Singapore and Thailand after 
the structural break.  On the other hand, in Tokyo time, the coefficient of Dt⋅∆JPYt was significantly 
negative and its absolute value was large during 11:00-20:00 in Singapore and Thailand, and 7:30-13:00 
and 18:30-20:00 in Taiwan.  This indicates that a positive impact of the Japanese yen that was observed 
before the structural break almost disappeared during these time zones after the regime shift of Malaysia.  
Comparing the absolute values of the significant coefficients, those in Singapore and Thailand tended to 
be larger than those in Korea and Taiwan.  This probably reflects the fact that Malaysia has had smaller 
linkages with Korea and Taiwan than with Singapore and Thailand. 
In contrast, we could see no significant dummies during 12:00-17:30 in New York time (that is, 
2:00-7:30 in Tokyo time) in Thailand and Taiwan.  During similar time zones, the coefficient of Dt⋅∆USDt 
was not significant in Singapore and neither was in Korea.  The results suggest that the structural break, if 
any, was very modest when both East Asian and European markets were closed. 
 
(c) From September 2nd 1998 to September 5th 2002 
Finally, we test whether the East Asian exchange rates had a structural break when some East Asian 
countries introduced inflation targeting effectively.  We test this by estimating equation (6) for the period 
from September 2nd 1998 to September 5th 2002.  In the estimation, the dummy variable Dt takes one 
from January 4th 2000 to September 5th 2002 but takes zero otherwise.  If the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt 
and Dt⋅∆JPYt are significantly different from zero, we can conclude that there was a structural break when 
some East Asian countries introduced inflation targeting effectively. 
Table 10 summarizes the estimation results.  In all countries, the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt and Dt⋅∆JPYt 
were significantly different from zero in several time zones.  When the coefficient of Dt⋅∆USDt was 
significantly different from zero, it tended to be positive.  In contrast, if the coefficient of Dt⋅∆JPYt was 
significantly different from zero, it tended to be negative.  The significant coefficients were more 
conspicuous in those of Dt⋅∆USDt.  The results imply that there was a significant structural break that 
increased the coefficient of the U.S. dollar and decreased the coefficient of the Japanese yen.  The results 
are highly consistent with our findings in the last section. 
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Tokyo time, it took large positive values during 11:00-16:00 in Singapore, 13:00-18:30 in Thailand.  Even 
in Korea and Taiwan, it took significantly positive values during similar time zones.  The positive 
coefficient of ∆USDt implies that the total impact of the U.S. dollar became close to one in the East Asian 
countries after the structural break. 
In contrast, the negative coefficient of Dt⋅∆JPYt was, if significant, moderate in its absolute value.  In 
Korea and Taiwan, the coefficient of Dt⋅∆JPYt took significantly a positive value in a time zone.  This 
probably reflects the fact that a positive impact of the Japanese yen had almost disappeared before the 
structural break.  In all countries, we could see no significant dummies during 12:00-17:30 in New York 
time (that is, 2:00-7:30 in Tokyo time) when both East Asian and European markets were closed. The 
results suggest that the structural break, if any, was negligible when both East Asian and European markets 
were closed.   
 
 
6. Tests of Structural Breaks: The Case of Rolling Regressions 
Until the last section, we have made estimations assuming that the dates of structural breaks were 
known.  The dates were chosen based on those of regime switches in some East Asian countries.  The 
choice, however, could be arbitrary particularly when inflation targeting was introduced.  The purpose of 
this section is to make formal tests to explore when the exchange rates had structural breaks in Singapore, 
Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan in 1998 and in early 2000.  By using the intra-daily data, we make rolling 
regressions of equation (6) and calculate series of t-values of the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt and Dt⋅∆JPYt in 
two alternative sample periods.  In each sample period, the starting date was always fixed.  We, however, 
changed the date of the structural break day by day.  We fixed the ending day of each sample period by 51 
days after the structural break. 
The first sample period was chosen to find out when the East Asian exchange rates had a structural 
break in 1997.  We start it from February 1st 1998 and change the date of the structural break from June 1st 
1998 to October 15th 1998.  We make the rolling regressions only for the time zones for which t-values of 
the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt and Dt⋅∆JPYt were significant at 10% level in Table 9.  Figure 2 shows how 
the calculated t-values changed in our rolling regressions.  The t-values vary depending on time zones and 
currencies.  Their absolute values, however, tend to exceed two from mid-July to late September.  This 
supports the view that the East Asian exchange rates had a structural break around September 1st 1998 
when Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange rate regime. 
The second sample period was chosen to find out when the East Asian exchange rates had a structural 
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November 1st 1999 to June 30th 2000.  We make the regressions only for the time zones for which t-values 
of the coefficients of Dt⋅∆USDt and Dt⋅∆JPYt were significant at 10% level in Table 10.  Figure 3 shows 
how the calculated t-values changed in our rolling regressions.  The t-values vary depending on time zones 
and currencies.  Their absolute values, however, tended to exceed two from late December 1999 to early 
2000.  This supports the view that the East Asian exchange rates had a structural break around early 2000 
when some East Asian countries introduced inflation targeting effectively. 
 
 
7. Comparison of Exchange Rate Volatility 
Until the last sections, we have investigated how and when the East Asian currencies changed their 
correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen.  We first found that the Japanese yen temporarily 
increased the correlations with the East Asian currencies after the crisis.  We, however, found that two 
structural breaks reduced the correlations with the Japanese yen and increased the correlations with the 
U.S. dollar in the East Asian currencies.  As a result, in terms of the correlations, the East Asian currencies 
began reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar after early 2000.   
The high correlations with the U.S. dollar, however, do not necessarily mean that the East Asian 
currencies have de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar.  During most of the time zones, the coefficient of the 
Japanese yen was significantly different from zero in most of the countries even after early 2000.  This 
implies that de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar after early 2000 were accompanied by some degree of 
flexibility that did not exist in the pre-crisis period. 
The purpose of this section is to explore how the structural breaks changed volatility of exchange rates in 
the post-crisis period.  By using the daily data (the data at 11:30am in New York in each business day), we 
calculate variation coefficients of each East Asian exchange rate through dividing its standard deviation by 
its mean.  We calculate the variation coefficients for the logged level and the daily growth rate of each East 
Asian exchange rate against the U.S. dollar.  We compare the calculated variation coefficients among five 
sample periods: (i) from January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997, (ii) from July 2nd 1997 to January 31st 1998, 
(iii) from February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998, (iv) from the September 2nd 1998 to December 
29th 1999, and (v) from January 4th 2000 to September 5th 2002.  The period (i) is the pre-crisis period.  
We choose this period as a benchmark period.  The period (ii) is the post-crisis period when many East 
Asian currencies experienced dramatic depreciations. In periods (iii), (iv), and (v), the East Asian 
currencies were relatively stabilized.  We divide these period by two structural breaks that arose when 
Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange rate regime and when some East Asian countries introduced 
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period to those in the pre-crisis period.  If the ratios are greater than one, we may conclude that the 
exchange rates became more flexible against the U.S. dollar than those in the pre-crisis period.   
Table 11 reports means, standard deviations, and variation coefficients of the logged level of each East 
Asian exchange rate against the U.S. dollar for each sub-sample period.  It also reports the ratios of the 
variation coefficients in each sub-sample period to those in the pre-crisis period.  When we compare the 
variation coefficients of each exchange rate, we can easily see that the variation coefficients increased in 
all of the East Asian currencies after the crisis.  The most dramatic increases occurred in the period (ii) 
when many East Asian currencies experienced dramatic depreciations.  The variation coefficients declined 
after the exchange rates were stabilized, particularly after September 1998.  However, except for Malaysia, 
the ratios were sill greater than two even after early 2000.  This implies that the levels of the East Asian 
exchange rates against the U.S. dollar were more flexible even after 2000 than those in the pre-crisis 
period.   
Table 12 summarized volatility of the daily growth rate of each East Asian exchange rate for each 
sub-sample period.  When we compare the variation coefficients of each exchange rate, we can see that the 
variation coefficients increased in all of the East Asian currencies in the period (ii).  This obviously reflects 
the fact that the East Asian currencies experienced dramatic depreciations.  The variation coefficients, 
however, declined steadily after September 1998.  In particular, except for Taiwan, the ratios became 
lower than one after early 2000.  This implies that the growth rates of the East Asian exchange rates against 
the U.S. dollar after 2000 had a stability that was comparable to those in the pre-crisis period.   
 
 
8. Alternative Interpretations 
Until the last sections, we have demonstrated that the East Asian currencies had changed their 
correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen in September 1998 and in early 2000.  We 
interpreted that the structural breaks arose when Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange rate regime and 
when some East Asian countries introduced inflation targeting effectively.  However, several other 
interpretations may be possible. 
One interpretation is that a change of macroeconomic correlation altered the correlations of East Asian 
exchange rates with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen.  Throughout the late 1990s, the U.S. economy 
was booming, while the Japanese economy experienced a long stagnation.  Since East Asian countries had 
shown a sharp recovery after the middle of 1998, macroeconomic fundamentals had a strong positive 
correlation with those of Japan in the first half of 1998 but with those of the United States after the latter 
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partial explanation on sources of the structural change in September 1998.   
However, since the change of macroeconomic correlation was gradual, it cannot explain a drastic 
structural change that we observed in the previous sections, particularly that in early 2000.  More 
importantly, the feature of the structural change was different in different time zones.  It is hard to explain 
the feature in terms of macroeconomic correlations. 
The other interpretation is that a structural change of the Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate 
changed the correlations of the East Asian exchange rates.  The Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate 
had series of structural breaks during the past decade.  Figure 4 draws movements of the yen/dollar 
exchange rates from January 1994 to December 2001.  It shows that the yen steadily depreciated against 
the U.S. dollar and that the rate of depreciation was accelerated after November 1997.  The trend of the 
depreciation had continued until the end of July 1998.  However, after August 1998, the yen, in turn, 
started appreciating against the U.S. dollar and that the appreciation had continued until the end of 
December 1999.  This indicates that if the East Asian currencies had asymmetric responses to appreciation 
and depreciation of the yen/dollar exchange rates, they could have had different correlations with the U.S. 
dollar and the Japanese yen before and after September 1998. 
The yen/dollar exchange rates, however, had a tendency to depreciate after early 2000.  If the 
asymmetric responses to the yen/dollar exchange rates were important, the estimated correlations would 
have been reversed and became similar to those before September 1998 in the post-crisis period.  We, 
however, found that the estimated correlations never returned to those before September 1998.  Instead, 
the East Asian currencies increased correlations with the U.S. dollar after early 2000.  The yen/dollar 




9. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we investigated the determinants of the post-crisis exchange rates of five East Asian 
countries: Singapore, Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia.  Based on intra-daily observations, we 
examined how and when these five East Asian currencies changed their correlations with the U.S. dollar 
and the Japanese yen.  During the time zones when East Asian and European markets were closed, the East 
Asian currencies kept strong correlations with the U.S. dollar throughout the pos-crisis period.  We, 
however, found two structural breaks in the post-crisis correlations during the time zones when East Asian 
markets were open.  The first structural break arose when Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate.  The 
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structural breaks suggest strong monetary linkages among East Asian countries.  After early 2000, the East 
Asian currencies began reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar. 
A noteworthy implication from our empirical results was that a regime switch in an East Asian country 
had an enormously large impact on the exchange rates of other East Asian countries that had no regime 
switch.  This probably reflects the fact that economic linkage among East Asian countries is tight in 
monetary and real transactions.  During the past decade, intra-regional trade among East Asian countries 
increased dramatically.  The increased intra-regional capital mobility intensified the linkage of financial 
markets in East Asia.  As a result, a regime switch in a country came to have a strong impact on its 
neighboring economies and that the affected economies came to have another impacts on their neighboring 
economies in East Asia.  Our empirical studies supported this view and suggest that the exchange rate 
linkage was very important to see why the post-crisis East Asian countries had a tendency reverting back 
to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar. 
In the present period, several East Asian economies adopt different types of exchange rate regimes; 
Hong Kong kept its currency board arrangement and the Chinese yuan virtually maintained its peg to the 
U.S. dollar.  After experiencing some transitional regime, Malaysia started pegging to the U.S. dollar on 
September 1st 1998.  In contrast, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea as well as the Philippines and Taiwan 
have adopted managed float since the crisis.  The so-called floating exchange regimes of these countries 
are, however, not really floating.  The de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar may destabilize the real “effective” 
exchange rates of these currencies.  To avoid another crisis in East Asia, it is an urgent issue to reconsider 
what is the desirable exchange rate regime in East Asian from a view of regional cooperation.  
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Table 2. Theoretical weights of the exchange rates based on trade weights
(1) Theoretical weights before August 31, 1998
Malaysia ringit Singapore dollar
US dollar 0.443 0.540
Yen 0.376 0.328
(2) Theoretical weights after September 1, 1998
- The Case of the Singapore dollar
case 1 case 2 case 3
US dollar 0.700 0.719 0.705
Yen 0.221 0.205 0.213
Notes 1) The theoretical weights in (1) were calculated based on trade weights in
        2) After September 1st 1998, the theoretical weights in cases 1, 2, and 3 wer
          calculated based on the trade weights in 1997, 98, and 99 respectively.
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  23Table 4. Correlations with the U.S. Dollar and the Japanese Yen  
ʙ Pre-Asian Crisis 
 
Sample period: January 4, 1997 ~ Jun 15, 1997
ᶃSingapore Dollar
NY time (12:00-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-2:00) (2:00-4:30) (4:30-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-800) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-16:00) (16:00-18:30) (18:30-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
h o u r s 6 h 1 h2 h2 h3 h 2 . 5 h 7 h 0 . 5 h
constant 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ***
US dollar 0.920 *** 0.970 *** 0.923 *** 0.852 *** 0.853 *** 0.662 *** 0.716 *** 0.977 ***
Japanese yen 0.035 * 0.068 0.108 * 0.110 *** 0.069 0.227 *** 0.213 *** -0.032
adj.R
2 0.949 0.891 0.688 0.748 0.786 0.735 0.893 0.973
D.W. 1.720 2.113 1.619 2.013 2.155 2.157 1.836 1.841
ᶄThai Baht
NY time (12:00-18:00) (18:00-21:00) (21:00-4:30) (4:30-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-800) (8:00-11:00) (11:00-18:30) (18:30-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 6h 3h 7.5h 7h 0.5h
constant -0.001 ** 0.002 * 0.001 -0.001
US dollar 1.156 *** * 1.382 ** 0.791 *** 0.003
Japanese yen -0.102 -0.568 -0.008 1.541
adj.R
2 0.637 0.103 0.182 0.125
D.W. 1.218 2.124 0.859 0.582
ᶅKorean Won
NY time (12:00-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-4:30) (4:30-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-800) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-18:30) (18:30-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 6h 1h 9.5h 7h 0.5h
constant -0.002 *** 0.000 * 0.008 * 0.003 ***
US dollar 0.902 *** 1.174 *** * 0.824 * 1.007 ***
Japanese yen 0.030 0.083 -0.103 -0.157
adj.R
2 0.821 0.643 0.042 0.607
D.W. 2.011 1.672 0.148 1.937
ᶆTaiwan Dollar
NY time (12:00-3:00) (3:00-4:30) (4:30-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-17:00) (17:00-18:30) (18:30-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 13h 1.5h 7h 0.5h
constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 ***
US dollar 0.840 *** 0.958 *** 0.925 *** 0.994 ***
Japanese yen 0.011 -0.020 * 0.100 -0.021
adj.R
2 0.800 0.756 0.967 0.971
D.W. 1.935 2.042 1.952 1.983
ᶇMalaysian Ringgit
NY time (12:00-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-23:00) (23:00-2:00) (2:00-4:30) (4:30-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-800) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-13:00) (13:00-16:00) (16:00-18:30) (18:30-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 6h 1h 4h 3h 2.5h 7h 0.5h
constant 0.000 0.000 0.123 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 ***
US dollar 0.958 *** 1.176 *** *** 0.135 *** 0.762 *** 0.770 *** 0.993 ***
Japanese yen 0.008 -0.028 0.231 ** 0.080 0.118 0.000
adj.R
2 0.961 0.774 0.170 0.678 0.900 0.986
D.W. 2.173 2.401 1.900 1.829 1.853 2.120


















  24Table 5. Correlations with the U.S. Dollar and the Japanese Yen 
ʙ Before Malaysia pegged the exchange rate system  
 
Sample period: February 1
th, 1998ʙAugust 31, 1998
ᶃSingapore Dollar
NY time (12:00-17:30) (17:30-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-20:00) (20:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-2:00) (2:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-7:30) (7:30-8:00) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-10:00) (10:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-16:00) (16:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 5.5h 0.5h 1h 1h 1h 2h 3h 2.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h
constant -0.0006 ** -0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0009 ** 0.0004 -0.0018 *** 0.0020 *** -0.0005 *** 0.0003 0.0003 **
US dollar 1.0040 *** 1.5944 *** 1.1495 *** 0.2475 0.2289 0.0466 0.0304 -0.0043 0.1089 ** 0.1229 ** 0.0673 **
Japanese yen -0.1170 -0.1609 0.0797 0.6255 * 0.5741 ** 0.8012 *** 0.7084 *** 0.9493 *** 0.8029 *** 0.5918 *** 0.6201 ***
adj.R
2 0.2010 0.1131 0.2204 0.3404 0.4402 0.3612 0.2423 0.4257 0.7602 0.4554 0.3510
D.W. 2.2406 1.9483 1.5704 2.1359 1.8374 2.0088 2.0830 2.1541 1.9288 2.1193 1.9882
ᶄThai Baht
NY time (12:00-17:30) (17:30-18:00) (18:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-7:30) (7:30-8:00) (8:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 5.5h 0.5h 3h 2h 5.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h
constant -0.0018 *** -0.0006 -0.0040 *** 0.0031 *** -0.0008 * 0.0008 0.0018 ***
US dollar 1.5082 *** 0.4951 0.0935 0.2237 * ** 0.1296 * 0.1864 ** 0.1294 **
Japanese yen -0.2223 -0.1596 0.4133 ** 0.7839 *** *** 0.8127 *** 0.6754 ** 0.6281 ***
adj.R
2 0.1077 0.0029 0.0282 0.1045 0.4509 0.1740 0.1882
D.W. 2.1704 2.0736 1.7296 1.8927 1.9785 2.0212 1.7063
ᶅKorean Won
NY time (12:00-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-23:00) (23:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-8:00) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-13:00) (13:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 6h 1h 4h 5.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h
constant *** 0.0007 -0.0010 0.0005 0.0005 *** 0.0014 ***
US dollar *** 0.8933 *** 0.6989 ** ** 0.7727 ** 0.4087 *** 0.1163 ***
Japanese yen -0.1162 0.1093 ** 0.7834 0.1366 ** 0.4122 ***
adj.R
2 0.0385 0.0471 0.1267 0.4334 0.1119
D.W. 1.7493 2.0705 1.6292 1.9476 1.8608
ᶆTaiwan Dollar
NY time (12:00-17:30) (17:30-23:00) (23:00-3:00) (3:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-7:30) (7:30-13:00) (13:00-17:00) (17:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 5.5h 5.5h 4h 1.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h
constant -0.0041 *** 0.0026 *** 0.0063 *** -0.0044 *** -0.0006 *** 0.0007 ** 0.0009 ***
US dollar 0.7504 ** 0.2204 * 0.1711 0.3805 *** 0.1555 *** 0.3726 *** 0.1121
Japanese yen -0.0391 0.5387 *** 0.4268 0.3258 *** 0.7387 *** 0.1256 ** 0.2937
adj.R
2 0.1045 0.1727 0.1389 0.4947 0.7136 0.3952 0.0490
D.W. 1.4150 1.8915 1.9690 1.9285 1.9276 1.7897 1.6578
ᶇMalaysian Ringgit
NY time (12:00-17:30) (17:30-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-20:00) (20:00-23:00) (23:00-2:00) (2:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-7:30) (7:30-8:00) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-10:00) (10:00-13:00) (13:00-16:00) (16:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 5.5h 0.5h 1h 1h 3h 3h 2.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h
constant -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.025 0.003 *** -0.002 *** 0.002 ** 0.001 ***
US dollar 1.029 *** 2.203 ** 1.817 ** 0.999 * -0.016 0.093 -0.002 -0.014 0.037
Japanese yen 0.018 -0.401 0.209 0.498 ** *** 0.603 *** 0.850 *** 0.855 *** 0.774 *** 0.686 ***
adj.R
2 0.055 0.028 0.087 0.144 0.139 0.174 0.399 0.206 0.133

















  25Table 6. Correlations with the U.S. Dollar and the Japanese Yen 
ʙ After Malaysia pegged the exchange rate system 
 
Sample period: September 2nd, 1998ʙDecember 29, 1999
ᶃSingapore Dollar
NY time (17:30-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-20:00) (20:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-2:00) (2:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-8:00) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-10:00) (10:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-16:00) (16:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 0.5h 1h 1h 1h 2h 3h 2.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 ** -0.0001 0.0003 *** -0.0005 *** 0.0006 ** -0.0003 ** -0.0003 0.0002 * -0.0002 **
US dollar 0.8068 *** 0.8823 *** 0.7923 *** 0.6694 *** 0.1482 *** 0.2236 *** 0.4812 *** 0.4323 *** 0.3546 *** 0.1486 *** 0.8538 ***
Japanese yen 0.1957 *** 0.0291 0.0750 * 0.1462 *** 0.2727 *** 0.2546 *** 0.1902 *** 0.2076 *** 0.2876 *** 0.3689 *** 0.1499 ***
R2 0.5321 0.6139 0.6939 0.7092 0.3424 0.4085 0.6055 0.5905 0.5795 0.3486 0.8425
DW 1.8882 1.7633 1.9551 2.0153 2.1367 1.4989 1.5231 1.9021 2.1123 1.8759 1.8358
ᶄThai Baht
NY time (17:30-18:00) (18:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-8:00) (8:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 0.5h 3h 2h 5.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant 0.0004 ** -0.0012 *** 0.0009 *** -0.0005 0.0001 0.0010 *** -0.0010 ***
US dollar 1.0777 *** 0.8610 *** 0.1705 *** *** 0.4243 *** 0.3751 *** 0.1263 *** 0.9125 ***
Japanese yen 0.0737 0.2132 ** 0.3704 *** *** 0.1934 *** 0.2625 *** 0.4045 *** 0.0495
R2 0.3572 0.1829 0.1374 0.3551 0.3848 0.1880 0.5557
DW 1.7841 1.8479 1.7499 1.7089 1.7804 1.8982 1.9743
ᶅKorean Won
NY time (17:30-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-23:00) (23:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-8:00) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-13:00) (13:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 0.5h 1h 4h 5.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant 0.0001 0.0007 *** -0.0007 ** -0.0006 * -0.0004 *** 0.0010 *** -0.0014 ***
US dollar 0.9806 *** 1.3011 *** 0.3146 *** *** 0.4149 *** 0.4369 *** 0.2116 *** 0.9626 ***
Japanese yen 0.0104 -0.0435 0.2375 *** ** 0.1617 ** 0.1643 *** 0.2573 *** 0.0424
R2 0.1914 0.4955 0.1940 0.1912 0.5254 0.2556 0.6106
DW 1.2167 1.3653 1.4789 1.7099 2.0624 1.7493 1.3676
ᶆTaiwan Dollar
NY time (17:30-23:00) (23:00-3:00) (3:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-13:00) (13:00-17:00) (17:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 5.5h 4h 1.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant -0.0001 0.0048 *** -0.0024 *** -0.0002 -0.0003 ** 0.0017 *** -0.0022 ***
US dollar 0.2424 *** 0.1393 *** 0.5301 *** 0.4202 *** 0.4266 *** 0.2082 *** 1.0170 ***
Japanese yen 0.2076 *** 0.2172 ** 0.1585 *** 0.1666 *** 0.1904 *** 0.3235 *** 0.0097
R2 0.2827 0.2013 0.5776 0.4667 0.5542 0.2601 0.7325











***, ***, * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
  26Table 7. Correlations with the U.S. Dollar and the Japanese Yen 
ʙ After the introduction of Inflation-Targeting in Some East Asian Countries 
 
Sample period: January 4, 2000ʙSeptember 5, 2002
ᶃSingapore Dollar
NY time (17:30-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-20:00) (20:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-2:00) (2:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-8:00) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-10:00) (10:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-16:00) (16:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 0.5h 1h 1h 1h 2h 3h 2.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0002 ** 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0002 *** 0.0000 0.0002 *** -0.0002 ***
US dollar 0.9807 *** 0.8659 *** 0.8860 *** 0.8373 *** 0.8293 *** 0.8159 *** 0.7719 *** 0.7848 *** 0.8255 *** 0.8747 *** 0.9238 ***
Japanese yen 0.0143 0.1227 ** 0.1158 ** 0.1118 0.1142 ** 0.2022 ** 0.1661 *** 0.1628 *** 0.1226 *** 0.1407 *** 0.0916 ***
R2 0.7923 0.7464 0.3146 0.2874 0.3581 0.4108 0.8694 0.8961 0.9287 0.9245 0.9506
DW 1.7631 1.8729 1.9310 1.8848 1.9962 1.9157 1.8689 2.0103 1.9330 1.9609 1.9975
ᶄThai Baht
NY time (17:30-18:00) (18:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-8:00) (8:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 0.5h 3h 2h 5.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant 0.0000 -0.0013 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 *** -0.0005 ***
US dollar 0.9226 *** 0.7967 *** 0.7752 *** *** 0.8357 *** 0.8819 *** 0.8920 *** 0.9738 ***
Japanese yen 0.1044 ** 0.1896 *** 0.1467 *** *** 0.1305 *** 0.1074 *** 0.1100 *** 0.0545 *
R2 0.5571 0.3827 0.2494 0.7679 0.9057 0.8923 0.9040
DW 1.9605 1.9578 1.6629 1.9676 2.0525 2.0715 2.0171
ᶅKorean Won
NY time (17:30-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-23:00) (23:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-8:00) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-13:00) (13:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 0.5h 1h 4h 5.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant -0.0002 0.0007 *** -0.0007 *** *** 0.0019 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0001 -0.0007 ***
US dollar 1.1967 *** 0.9495 *** 0.5427 *** *** 0.8239 *** 0.9847 *** 0.9333 *** 0.9686 ***
Japanese yen -0.1380 0.1929 * 0.3515 *** ** 0.1352 * 0.0042 0.0789 ** -0.0098
R2 0.2944 0.2552 0.1601 0.3062 0.8592 0.6490 0.6086
DW 1.5930 1.7885 1.8171 1.1561 1.5887 1.2196 1.1305
ᶆTaiwan Dollar
NY time (17:30-23:00) (23:00-3:00) (3:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-13:00) (13:00-17:00) (17:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 5.5h 4h 1.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant 0.0002 *** 0.0019 -0.0010 *** 0.0008 *** -0.0003 *** 0.0006 *** -0.0007 ***
US dollar 0.8198 *** 0.6857 *** 0.9216 *** 0.9738 *** 0.9767 *** 0.9730 *** 1.0483 ***
Japanese yen 0.0570 0.1354 0.0378 0.0223 0.0070 -0.0818 -0.0857 *
R2 0.4687 0.6857 0.7601 0.7183 0.9119 0.4566 0.6155
DW 1.6203 1.9698 1.8167 1.8079 1.8285 1.4508 1.6583













  27Table 8:  Structural Stability Test after the Crisis 
 
Sample period: January 4, 1997 ʙ August 31, 1998 (excluding the period from July 2, 1997 until January 31, 1998)
ᶃSingapore Dollar
NY time (12:00-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-2:00) (2:00-4:30) (4:30-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-800) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-16:00) (16:00-18:30) (18:30-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
h o u r s 6 h1 h2 h2 h3 h 2 . 5 h 7 h 0 . 5 h
constant 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 ***
US dollar (a) 0.928 *** 0.968 *** 0.911 *** 0.856 *** 0.675 *** 0.626 *** 0.711 *** 0.981 ***
Japanese yen (b) 0.029 0.061 0.127 * 0.113 *** 0.158 ** 0.336 *** 0.224 *** -0.033
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) -0.346 *** 0.184 -0.277 -0.808 *** -0.617 *** -0.624 *** -0.535 *** -0.913 ***
Japanese Yen (d) 0.197 *** 0.020 0.212 0.687 *** 0.545 *** 0.611 *** 0.475 *** 0.648 ***
(a) + (c) 0.582 *** 1.152 *** 0.634 *** 0.048 0.059 0.003 0.176 *** 0.068 **
(b) + (d) 0.226 *** 0.081 0.338 *** 0.801 *** 0.703 *** 0.947 *** 0.698 *** 0.616 ***
R2 0.489 0.328 0.234 0.389 0.268 0.449 0.699 0.639
DW 1.560 1.583 2.024 2.009 2.032 2.070 2.245 1.955
ᶄMalaysian Ringgit
NY time (12:00-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-23:00) (23:00-2:00) (2:00-4:30) (4:30-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-800) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-13:00) (13:00-16:00) (16:00-18:30) (18:30-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 6h 1h 4h 3h 2.5h 7h 0.5h
constant 0.000 -0.001 * -0.019 0.002 *** 0.000 0.001 ***
US dollar (a) 0.954 *** 1.152 *** *** -0.020 0.681 *** 0.773 *** 1.020 ***
Japanese yen (b) 0.013 -0.013 0.350 *** 0.270 ** 0.116 * -0.001
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) -0.571 0.654 *** 0.009 -0.598 *** -0.646 *** -0.985 ***
Japanese Yen (d) 0.342 0.217 *** 0.261 0.587 *** 0.638 *** 0.676 ***
(a) + (c) 0.383 1.806 ** -0.011 0.082 0.126 0.036
(b) + (d) 0.355 0.203 *** 0.611 *** 0.857 *** 0.755 *** 0.675 ***
R2 0.082 0.113 0.193 0.197 0.406 0.336
DW 1.978 1.986 2.044 2.291 1.940 2.116
ᶅThai Baht
NY time (12:00-18:00) (18:00-21:00) (21:00-4:30) (4:30-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-800) (8:00-11:00) (11:00-18:30) (18:30-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 6h 3h 7.5h 7h 0.5h
constant -0.002 *** *** 0.003 *** 0.002 -0.001
US dollar (a) 1.120 *** * 1.321 ** 0.851 *** 0.389
Japanese yen (b) 0.380 * -0.542 -0.012 0.923
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) -0.424 * -1.190 ** -0.642 ** -0.289
Japanese Yen (d) -0.328 ** 1.204 0.720 ** -0.284
(a) + (c) 0.696 *** 0.132 0.209 ** 0.100
(b) + (d) 0.053 * 0.662 *** 0.708 *** 0.639 ***
R2 0.198 0.089 0.122 0.021
DW 1.862 1.708 0.781 0.452
ᶆKorean Won
NY time (12:00-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-4:30) (4:30-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-800) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-18:30) (18:30-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 6h 1h 9.5h 7h 0.5h
constant -0.002 *** 0.000 ** 0.005 ** 0.002 ***
US dollar (a) 0.902 *** 1.178 *** *** 0.776 *** 0.973 ***
Japanese yen (b) 0.036 0.066 0.023 -0.144
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) 0.150 -0.155 *** -0.259 -0.852 ***
Japanese Yen (d) -0.128 -0.088 0.574 0.553 ***
(a) + (c) 1.052 *** 1.023 *** * 0.517 ** 0.122 ***
(b) + (d) -0.092 -0.022 ** 0.597 * 0.408 ***
R2 0.400 0.124 0.059 0.288
DW 1.920 1.837 0.943 1.769
ᶇTaiwan Dollar
NY time (12:00-3:00) (3:00-4:30) (4:30-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-17:00) (17:00-18:30) (18:30-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 13h 1.5h 7h 0.5h
constant 0.001 -0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 ***
US dollar (a) 0.746 *** 0.628 *** 0.925 *** 0.999 ***
Japanese yen (b) 0.025 0.021 0.096 -0.019
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) -0.016 -0.134 * -0.536 *** -0.884 ***
Japanese Yen (d) 0.148 ** 0.199 * 0.241 0.296
(a) + (c) 0.730 *** 0.494 *** 0.389 *** 0.115
(b) + (d) 0.173 ** 0.220 ** 0.336 ** 0.276
R2 0.363 0.512 0.644 0.265
DW 1.737 1.852 1.974 1.701
***, ***, * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 






























  28Table 9:  Structural Stability Test after Malaysia pegged the exchange rate 
 
Sample period: February 1
th, 1998 ʙDecember 29, 1998
ᶃSingapore Dollar
NY time (12:00-17:30) (17:30-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-20:00) (20:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-2:00) (2:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-7:30) (7:30-8:00) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-10:00) (10:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-16:00) (16:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 5.5h 0.5h 1h 1h 1h 2h 3h 2.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h
constant 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 **
US dollar (a) 0.994 *** 1.640 *** 1.169 *** 0.205 0.167 0.041 0.036 -0.030 0.108 ** 0.126 *** 0.084 ***
Japanese yen (b) -0.115 -0.142 0.079 0.639 * 0.575 ** 0.810 *** 0.712 *** 0.950 *** 0.819 *** 0.619 *** 0.610 ***
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) -0.180 -0.981 ** -0.512 0.880 * 0.690 *** 0.121 0.182 0.433 ** 0.318 * 0.290 *** 0.177 **
Japanese Yen (d) 0.333 *** 0.408 * 0.020 -0.314 -0.139 -0.667 *** -0.550 *** -0.805 *** -0.682 *** -0.371 ** -0.313 *
(a) + (c) 0.814 *** 0.660 *** 0.657 *** 1.085 *** 0.858 *** 0.163 ** 0.218 *** 0.403 ** 0.426 *** 0.415 *** 0.261 ***
(b) + (d) 0.218 *** 0.265 *** 0.099 ** 0.325 ** 0.435 ** 0.143 0.162 ** 0.145 0.137 0.248 *** 0.297 ***
adj.R
2 0.420 0.139 0.223 0.371 0.433 0.352 0.250 0.390 0.668 0.507 0.317
D.W. 2.129 1.915 1.653 2.041 1.780 2.041 2.095 2.116 2.049 2.079 1.829
ᶄThai Baht
NY time (12:00-17:30) (17:30-18:00) (18:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-7:30) (7:30-8:00) (8:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 5.5h 0.5h 3h 2h 5.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h
constant -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.000 0.001 0.002 ***
US dollar (a) 1.504 *** 0.468 0.092 0.224 * * 0.131 * 0.189 ** 0.127 **
Japanese yen (b) -0.221 -0.171 0.398 ** 0.801 *** *** 0.818 *** 0.682 ** 0.630 ***
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) -0.426 0.516 0.977 *** -0.006 0.278 * 0.309 *** 0.145
Japanese Yen (d) 0.250 0.255 -0.223 -0.550 ** *** -0.864 *** -0.455 -0.300
(a) + (c) 1.077 *** 0.984 *** 1.069 *** 0.218 *** *** 0.409 *** 0.498 *** 0.272 **
(b) + (d) 0.028 0.084 0.175 *** 0.251 ** -0.046 0.227 *** 0.329 ***
adj.R
2 0.214 0.018 0.063 0.107 0.360 0.216 0.197
D.W. 2.155 2.070 1.698 1.851 1.899 2.006 1.774
ᶅKorean Won
NY time (12:00-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-23:00) (23:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-8:00) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-13:00) (13:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 6h 1h 4h 5.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h
constant *** 0.001 ** -0.001 0.000 0.000 * 0.001 ***
US dollar (a) *** 0.886 *** 0.699 ** ** 0.770 ** 0.410 *** 0.117 ***
Japanese yen (b) -0.120 0.110 ** 0.777 0.140 ** 0.412 ***
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) 0.880 -0.472 -0.648 0.150 ** 0.252 **
Japanese Yen (d) 0.255 0.146 ** -0.724 -0.139 * -0.234
(a) + (c) *** 1.766 ** 0.227 * *** 0.123 0.561 *** 0.368 ***
(b) + (d) 0.135 ** 0.256 0.052 0.001 0.178
adj.R
2 0.139 0.050 0.116 0.472 0.164
D.W. 1.610 2.034 1.648 1.954 1.903
ᶆTaiwan Dollar
NY time (12:00-17:30) (17:30-23:00) (23:00-3:00) (3:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00)
Tokyo time (2:00-7:30) (7:30-13:00) (13:00-17:00) (17:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00)
hours 5.5h 5.5h 4h 1.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h
constant -0.004 *** 0.002 *** 0.005 *** -0.003 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 0.001 ***
US dollar (a) 0.714 ** 0.224 * 0.238 ** 0.459 *** 0.156 *** 0.376 *** 0.115
Japanese yen (b) -0.031 0.564 *** 0.355 0.257 ** 0.741 *** 0.132 ** 0.291
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) 0.326 -0.015 -0.251 ** -0.005 0.162 0.191 ** 0.177 *
Japanese Yen (d) 0.049 -0.458 *** -0.292 -0.142 -1.030 *** -0.095 -0.033
(a) + (c) 1.041 *** 0.209 ** -0.013 0.454 *** 0.318 *** 0.567 *** 0.292 ***
(b) + (d) 0.018 0.105 0.063 0.115 -0.289 *** 0.038 0.258 **
adj.R
2 0.368 0.172 0.132 0.464 0.611 0.476 0.101
D.W. 1.389 1.763 1.965 1.980 2.001 1.793 1.686
***, ***, * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 




















  29Table 10: Structural Stability Test after the Introduction of Inflation Targeting 
 
Sample period: September 2
nd, 1998 ʙ September 5, 2002
ᶃSingapore Dollar
NY time (17:30-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-20:00) (20:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-2:00) (2:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-8:00) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-10:00) (10:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-16:00) (16:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 0.5h 1h 1h 1h 2h 3h 2.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
US dollar (a) 0.808 *** 0.882 *** 0.794 *** 0.482 *** 0.134 *** 0.231 *** 0.483 *** 0.430 *** 0.353 *** 0.149 *** 0.855 ***
Japanese yen (b) 0.194 *** 0.030 0.083 ** 0.203 *** 0.377 *** 0.254 *** 0.184 *** 0.210 *** 0.293 *** 0.367 *** 0.148 ***
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) 0.173 * -0.014 0.089 0.355 ** 0.689 *** 0.580 *** 0.286 *** 0.352 *** 0.472 *** 0.727 *** 0.069
Japanese Yen (d) -0.179 *** 0.091 0.033 -0.091 -0.260 *** -0.055 -0.018 -0.048 -0.171 *** -0.227 *** -0.057
(a) + (c) 0.981 *** 0.868 *** 0.883 *** 0.837 *** 0.823 *** 0.811 *** 0.769 *** 0.781 *** 0.825 *** 0.876 *** 0.924 ***
(b) + (d) 0.014 0.121 ** 0.115 ** 0.112 0.117 ** 0.199 ** 0.166 *** 0.161 *** 0.122 *** 0.140 *** 0.091 ***
R2 0.680 0.680 0.498 0.402 0.417 0.407 0.781 0.794 0.811 0.769 0.912
DW 1.843 1.804 1.933 1.912 2.040 1.754 1.646 1.916 2.059 1.897 1.897
ᶄThai Baht
NY time (17:30-18:00) (18:00-21:00) (21:00-23:00) (23:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-8:00) (8:00-11:00) (11:00-13:00) (13:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 0.5h 3h 2h 5.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant 0.000 * -0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 0.001 *** -0.001 ***
US dollar (a) 1.077 *** 0.858 *** 0.193 *** *** 0.419 *** 0.375 *** 0.122 *** 0.908 ***
Japanese yen (b) 0.060 0.147 ** 0.213 * *** 0.206 *** 0.262 *** 0.394 *** 0.042
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) -0.151 -0.056 0.595 *** *** 0.413 *** 0.507 *** 0.781 *** 0.074
Japanese Yen (d) 0.041 0.037 -0.073 -0.077 -0.155 *** -0.290 *** 0.017
(a) + (c) 0.926 *** 0.803 *** 0.788 *** *** 0.832 *** 0.882 *** 0.903 *** 0.982 ***
(b) + (d) 0.101 * 0.184 *** 0.140 *** *** 0.129 *** 0.107 *** 0.104 *** 0.059 *
R2 0.455 0.275 0.170 0.602 0.696 0.602 0.751
DW 1.850 1.877 1.746 1.803 1.824 1.891 1.962
ᶅKorean Won
NY time (17:30-18:00) (18:00-19:00) (19:00-23:00) (23:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-8:00) (8:00-9:00) (9:00-13:00) (13:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 0.5h 1h 4h 5.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant 0.000 0.001 *** -0.001 *** *** 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** -0.001 ***
US dollar (a) 0.963 *** 1.301 *** 0.313 *** *** 0.404 *** 0.435 *** 0.197 *** 0.948 ***
Japanese yen (b) 0.023 -0.044 0.236 *** * 0.177 ** 0.184 *** 0.249 *** 0.048
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) 0.237 -0.352 * 0.230 * *** 0.406 *** 0.548 *** 0.758 *** 0.031
Japanese Yen (d) -0.164 0.237 ** 0.115 -0.047 -0.183 *** -0.181 *** -0.052
(a) + (c) 1.200 *** 0.949 *** 0.543 *** *** 0.810 *** 0.983 *** 0.955 *** 0.980 ***
(b) + (d) -0.141 0.194 * 0.352 *** ** 0.129 * 0.001 0.068 * -0.004
R2 0.254 0.347 0.174 0.259 0.745 0.535 0.610
DW 1.433 1.670 1.690 1.306 1.765 1.377 1.201
ᶆTaiwan Dollar
NY time (17:30-23:00) (23:00-3:00) (3:00-4:30) (4:30-6:00) (6:00-11:30) (11:30-12:00) (12:00-17:30)
Tokyo time (7:30-13:00) (13:00-17:00) (17:00-18:30) (18:30-20:00) (20:00-1:30) (1:30-2:00) (2:00-7:30)
hours 5.5h 4h 1.5h 1.5h 5.5h 0.5h 5.5h
constant 0.000 0.003 *** -0.002 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** -0.001 ***
US dollar (a) 0.242 *** 0.223 *** 0.577 *** 0.417 *** 0.427 *** 0.190 *** 0.990 ***
Japanese yen (b) 0.204 *** 0.001 0.130 *** 0.169 *** 0.191 *** 0.314 *** 0.012
Dummy variable 
U.S. dollar (c) 0.576 *** 0.277 *** 0.289 *** 0.552 *** 0.550 *** 0.809 *** 0.081
Japanese Yen (d) -0.143 ** 0.266 ** -0.049 -0.148 ** -0.184 *** -0.408 *** -0.085
(a) + (c) 0.817 *** 0.500 *** 0.866 *** 0.968 *** 0.977 *** 0.999 *** 1.071 ***
(b) + (d) 0.062 0.268 *** 0.081 *** 0.020 0.007 -0.094 -0.073
R2 0.383 0.527 0.711 0.647 0.800 0.401 0.645
DW 1.693 1.911 1.812 1.814 2.018 1.471 1.519
***, ***, * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 




















  30Table 11: Volatility of Daily Logarithmic Exchange Rates against the U.S. Dollar 
ᶃTaiwan Dollar
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 698
Mean (αʣ 27.61027 30.41252 33.63100 32.48628 32.99810
Standard Deviation
(βʣ
0.14761 2.19412 0.86809 0.74824 1.62919
Variation Coefficient
((βʣ/(α))
0.00535 0.07215 0.02581 0.02303 0.04937
Ratio of Variation
Coefficient (*)
13.49471 4.82814 4.30819 9.23504
ᶄSingapore Dollar
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 698
Mean (αʣ 1.42827 1.57380 1.66677 1.68720 1.76894
Standard Deviation
(βʣ
0.01336 0.09667 0.05574 0.03132 0.04711
Variation Coefficient
((βʣ/(α))
0.00935 0.06143 0.03344 0.01857 0.02663
Ratio of Variation
Coefficient (*)
6.56633 3.57502 1.98464 2.84673
ᶅMalaysian Ringgit
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 698
Mean (αʣ 2.49401 3.32496 3.92322 3.80094 3.79997
Standard Deviation
(βʣ
0.01456 0.60177 0.20104 0.01672 0.00300
Variation Coefficient
((βʣ/(α))
0.00584 0.18099 0.05124 0.00440 0.00079
Ratio of Variation
Coefficient (*)
31.00183 8.77787 0.75373 0.13512
ᶆKorean Won
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 698
Mean (αʣ 872.28918 1114.13485 1411.04897 1218.52738 1222.00391
Standard Deviation
(βʣ
19.45144 325.85641 111.11731 63.61473 79.53863
Variation Coefficient
((βʣ/(α))
0.02230 0.29247 0.07875 0.05221 0.06509
Ratio of Variation
Coefficient (*)
13.11587 3.53141 2.34116 2.91887
ᶇThai Baht
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 698
Mean (αʣ 25.74256 38.82225 41.53185 37.83687 42.48220
Standard Deviation
(βʣ
0.51792 7.32354 2.50036 1.29093 2.44786
Variation Coefficient
((βʣ/(α))
0.02012 0.18864 0.06020 0.03412 0.05762
Ratio of Variation
Coefficient (*)
9.37620 2.99232 1.69580 2.86396
ᶈJapanese Yen
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 698
Mean (αʣ 121.01932 122.81633 135.41444 116.15569 117.71373
Standard Deviation
(βʣ
4.16006 5.49671 6.55690 8.27495 8.79628
Variation Coefficient
((βʣ/(α))
0.03438 0.04476 0.04842 0.07124 0.07473
Ratio of Variation
Coefficient (*)
1.30197 1.40860 2.07243 2.17384
(*) They are relative variation coefficients against the value of the pre-crisis period indicated in column (a).  
  31Table 12: Volatility of Daily Change of Foreign Exchanges against the U.S. Dollar 
ᶃTaiwan Dollar
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 697
Mean 0.00013 0.00121 0.00014 -0.00028 0.00016
Standard Deviation 0.00163 0.00992 0.00766 0.00657 0.00426
Ratio of Standard
Deviation (*)
6.08451 4.69731 4.02759 2.61535
Maximum 0.00909 0.05925 0.02482 0.02749 0.05238
Minimum -0.00928 -0.05838 -0.02005 -0.02829 -0.05392
Range 0.01838 0.11763 0.04487 0.05578 0.10631
Ratio of Range (**) 6.40126 2.44155 3.03565 5.78504
ᶄSingapore Dollar
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 697
Mean 0.00013 0.00123 0.00016 -0.00008 0.00008
Standard Deviation 0.00264 0.00660 0.00972 0.00652 0.00274
Ratio of Standard
Deviation (*)
2.49818 3.68172 2.46661 1.03815
Maximum 0.01161 0.02277 0.03062 0.02229 0.01432
Minimum -0.01140 -0.02532 -0.03452 -0.01876 -0.01320
Range 0.02301 0.04810 0.06513 0.04105 0.02753
Ratio of Range (**) 2.08988 2.83024 1.78382 1.19615
ᶅMalaysian Ringgit
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 697
Mean 0.00003 0.00331 -0.00036 -0.00012 0.00000
Standard Deviation 0.00283 0.01865 0.01671 0.00607 0.00106
Ratio of Standard
Deviation (*)
6.58092 5.89624 2.14127 0.37549
Maximum 0.01221 0.06519 0.05623 0.01473 0.01267
Minimum -0.01235 -0.06513 -0.06192 -0.03831 -0.01313
Range 0.02456 0.13031 0.11815 0.05304 0.02579
Ratio of Range (**) 5.30570 4.81033 2.15940 1.05011
ᶆKorean Won
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 697
Mean -0.00007 0.00370 -0.00137 -0.00040 0.00009
Standard Deviation 0.00687 0.04160 0.02404 0.00927 0.00609
Ratio of Standard
Deviation (*)
6.05644 3.50096 1.35031 0.88736
Maximum 0.02093 0.15943 0.12352 0.03415 0.03287
Minimum -0.02650 -0.17148 -0.08148 -0.02572 -0.02704
Range 0.04743 0.33091 0.20500 0.05986 0.05991
Ratio of Range (**) 6.97694 4.32221 1.26217 1.26313
ᶇThai Baht
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 697
Mean -0.00047 0.00476 -0.00172 -0.00021 0.00019
Standard Deviation 0.00791 0.02164 0.01760 0.00796 0.00419
Ratio of Standard
Deviation (*)
2.73506 2.22371 1.00545 0.52918
Maximum 0.03689 0.15906 0.05434 0.02842 0.02914
Minimum -0.04386 -0.05303 -0.06836 -0.03036 -0.02703
Range 0.08075 0.21210 0.12270 0.05878 0.05617
Ratio of Range (**) 2.62647 1.51939 0.72794 0.69559
ᶈJapanese Yen
(a)1997.1.7-1997.6.15 (b)1997.7.2-1998.1.31 (c)1998.2.1-1998.8.31 (d)1998.9.2-1999.12.29 (e)2000.1.5-2002.9.5
Observations 115 154 151 346 697
Mean -0.00014 0.00066 0.00078 -0.00085 0.00020
Standard Deviation 0.00861 0.00870 0.01052 0.01321 0.00632
Ratio of Standard
Deviation (*)
1.01003 1.22205 1.53423 0.73419
Maximum 0.02788 0.02038 0.02455 0.05567 0.02129
Minimum -0.03232 -0.04347 -0.03592 -0.07485 -0.02416
Range 0.06020 0.06385 0.06048 0.13052 0.04545
Ratio of Range (**) 1.06063 1.00457 2.16807 0.75494
(*) They are relative standard deviation against the value of the pre-crisis period indicated in column (a).
(**) They are relative range against the value of the pre-crisis period indicated in column (a).
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  33Figure 2-1: Structural Stability Test around September 1998: The Case of Singapore 
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  34Figure 2-2: Structural Stability Test around September 1998: The Case of Thailand 
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  35Figure 2-3: Structural Stability Test around September 1998: The Case of Korea 











6/1/98 6/21/98 7/11/98 7/31/98 8/20/98 9/9/98 9/29/98
US Dollar







6/1/98 6/21/98 7/11/98 7/31/98 8/20/98 9/9/98 9/29/98
Japanese Yen










6/1/98 6/21/98 7/11/98 7/31/98 8/20/98 9/9/98 9/29/98
US Dollar Japanese Yen
 
 
  36Figure 2-4: Structural Stability Test around September 1998: The Case of Taiwan 




































































  37Figure 3-1: Structural Stability Test around early 2000: The Case of Singapore 

















































































  38Figure 3-2: Structural Stability Test around early 2000: The Case of Thailand 

























































  39Figure 3-3: Structural Stability Test around early 2000: The Case of Korea 
















































  40Figure 3-4: Structural Stability Test around early 2000: The Case of Taiwan 
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Figure 4. Movements of the Yen/the U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate (Yen/$)
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